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ABSTRACT
This study employed Enders and Siklos asymmetric co-integration
frameworks, including the momentum threshold autoregressive
(M-TAR) and logistic smooth transition co-integration (LSTC) mod-
els, to investigate whether contagion effects had existed in inter-
national stock markets by using the changes in the asymmetric
co-integration relationships between the U.S. S&P 500 Index and
a total of 23 markets in Asia, Europe, and America during the sub-
prime crisis. The main findings demonstrated that the subprime
crisis did not reinforce co-movement trends between the S&P 500
Index and these stock markets, by the application of the Engle-
Granger (1987) symmetric co-integration test. However, with the
application of the asymmetric co-integration frameworks, both M-
TAR and LSTC showed there existed contagion effects between
them in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in 2008;
transition speeds between these two regimes also substantially
increased in the LSTC during the financial crisis. Only the Chinese
market was not affected by the U.S. market during this crisis; only
an interdependence effect existed between the U.S. and China.
The subprime crisis determined the degree of contagion, depend-
ing on the financial linkage to the U.S. market, which further
demonstrates the differences in the causes and influence between
the subprime crisis and other financial crises in emerging markets.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 24 March 2018









The subprime crisis (2007–2012) disordered the U.S., Europe (Eurozone) and global
financial markets and economies (Longstaff, 2010). The Fed passed a bailout plan for
investment banks and institutions and had poured more than 1000 billion dollars
into the financial markets to purchase the non-performing loans to rescue the liquid-
ity of the U.S. financial markets through quantitative easing (QE).1
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Past literature about the contagion phenomenon due to financial crises by Lee and
Kim (1993), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Caramazza et al. (2004), Dungey et al.
(2006), Lucey and Voronkova (2008), Gilmore et al. (2008), Arouria et al. (2009) that
included the contagion effect or the transmission effect had been based on the back-
grounds of several financial crises since the late 1980s, including those in the U.S.
(1987), Mexico (1994), Thailand (1997), Russian (1998), and Argentina (1999).
Recent literature, such as that by Sikka et al. (2009), Swan (2009), Longstaff (2010),
Claessens et al. (2010), Abad et al. (2010), Sobreira (2011), Iyer and Peydro (2011),
Samarakoon (2011), Afonso et al. (2012), Chouliaras et al. (2012), Frankel and
Saravelos (2012), Dumontaux and Pop (2013), Kenourgios et al. (2013), Bekaert et al.
(2014) and Jiang et al. (2017) about the contagion effect was based on the back-
grounds of the subprime crisis and the European Monetary Union (EMU) sovereign-
debt crisis (2009–2013).
The subprime crisis was an epochal—and the most indicative—crisis in the afore-
mentioned crises. Although the U.S. stock market collapse in 1987 triggered a global
stock market crash, the background of international macroeconomic and technological
applications was a lot different from that of the subprime crisis in terms of globalisa-
tion and liberalisation of the trade environment and the rapid development of capital
markets in emerging countries. Freer capital flow among international security markets,
electronic trading systems and the linkage of the internet in stock markets as well as
highly developed derivatives have all accelerated the speed of information transmission
and increased the links between the international security markets, and these factors
have brought about significant differences between the subprime crisis and the U.S.
stock market collapse in 1987. Other financial crises in Mexico, Thailand, Russia, Brazil
and Argentina were only regional crises from emerging markets; therefore, the scope of
their influence was limited only to the neighbouring countries where the crises
occurred, and these crises did not spread globally; apparently, the impact of the sub-
prime crisis was greater than that of the aforementioned events.
Moreover, the excessively issued derivatives by banks and the major negligence in
the financial regulatory systems in the U.S. and western European countries caused the
subprime crisis, which showed that there existed a significant difference in the cause of
the subprime crisis compared to the past financial crises in emerging markets.2 The
subprime crisis also hit the real output of the U.S. and global economy. Corporate
bankruptcies accompanied by unemployment and capital expenditure cuts led to the
decline in every country in consumption, investment, import, and export. The U.S.,
Eurozone and part of Asia all suffered a recession in the period from the fourth quarter
of 2008 to 2010. Scholars thought the chain reactions incurred by the subprime crisis
had never been seen since the Great Depression (1929–1933). The financial institutions
and investors with investments in subprime products lost a lot of money. Hence, the
liquidity of the financial markets decreased severely. The financial institutions needed
capital injections from their governments. The major industrial countries contributed
and coordinated their policies to reverse the financial disaster.
The subprime crisis, which seems to have had a perceived structural change
regarding the influence of the U.S. stock market, has had a great effect upon the
major financial markets of the whole world (Gorton, 2009; Longstaff, 2010;
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Kenourgios and Dimitriou, 2015; Flavin and Sheenan, 2015). Therefore, we used this
crisis as the breaking point to investigate the influence of the U.S. stock market on
the Asian, European, and American stock markets around the subprime crisis.
Because past research about the contagion effect due to financial crises mostly
emphasised the crises from emerging or developing countries (Caramazza et al., 2004;
Caporale et al., 2005; Dungey et al., 2006; Arouria et al., 2009), the scope of their
influence was limited. The subprime crisis, which caused a global financial crisis, was
a rare incident of the past one hundred years (Dimitriou et al., 2013; Lien et al.,
2018); nevertheless, its impact can still be seen at present. How were the relationships
between the U.S. stock market and global stock markets affected when an impact of a
significant risk event occurred, e.g., the subprime crisis, due to the stronger links of
the international financial markets? Was the impact more significant during the
period of 'the subprime crisisʼ than that during 'tranquil timesʼ? Was the relationship
changed by the negative impact of the subprime crisis? This study attempts to clarify
the changes of relationships between the U.S. stock market and international stock
markets during tranquil times and during crisis times. We want to offer our opinions
to investors about investing in international security markets, and we also hope to
provide references to government departments on policy-making for financial over-
sight, which was the first research motivation of our study.
For the contagion effect, the co-integration method was often employed to examine
whether a co-integration relationship around a crisis had changed in past literature.
Two points were considered in this study. Firstly, the use of 'symmetric adjustmentsʼ
in the traditional co-integration model ignored that adjustment speeds were different
when the stock market was in an upward status or in a downward status. Li and Lam
(1995), Koutmos (1998), and Chiang (2001) indicated that co-integration between stock
markets was asymmetric; Wang and Lin (2005), Shen et al. (2007), and Chang (2008,
2010) further employed the asymmetric co-integration test for their empirical studies.
Therefore, to seek a better method to confer the interaction across international stock
markets became the main topic in this article. We employed the 'asymmetric co-inte-
grationʼ or 'non-linear co-integrationʼ method to compare the changes in the asymmet-
ric co-integration relationships between the U.S. stock market and the other stock
markets during the subprime crisis; a regime-shift model is a method which observes
the influence sustainability from information to the stock markets, and it is not
affected by structural breaks or structural change points. We continued the approach
framework in our earlier studies (Nieh et al., 2011; Nieh et al., 2012), which employed
the Enders and Siklos (2001) momentum threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) model to
investigate the regime-switching behavior in these co-integration relationships.
The Enders and Siklos (2001) threshold co-integration model is not accurately and
fully specified when the transition of the transitional variables or threshold variables
is a jump transition process. The problems, such as whether the transition of the
transitional variables is smooth between two regimes or whether there is heterosce-
dasticity in the information transmission in international stock markets, are seldom
considered in the Enders-Siklos threshold co-integration method.
Secondly, we investigated how the asymmetric adjustment and the smooth transi-
tion phenomenon influenced the contagion effect. We applied the logistic smooth
2424 Y.-S. KAO ET AL.
transition regressive (LSTR) method proposed by Granger and Ter€asvirta (1993) and
Ter€asvirta (1994, 1998), which was the expansion of the Enders-Siklos threshold co-
integration model and the logistic smooth transition co-integration (LSTC) model, to
compare the contagion effect from the U.S. stock market to the Asian, European, and
American stock markets, pre- and during the subprime crisis. Therefore, asymmetric
adjustments and smooth transition could exist in an upward status (positive impact)
or a downward status (negative impact). How did the two phenomena influence con-
tagion effects of the stock markets? Did different correlations, co-movement, inter-
dependence, or contagion effects exist in bull markets or bear markets? These issues
were seldom discussed in previous literature; therefore, we decided to explore these
issues by employing the threshold co-integration model and the logistic smooth tran-
sition co-integration model. The second research motivation of our study was to find
the differences between the results of the symmetric co-integration test and the asym-
metric co-integration tests, including the M-TAR and the LSTC models, as well as
the differences between the M-TAR and LSTC models.
The structure of this article is arranged as follows: Previous literature regarding
contagion effects, including the theoretical and empirical studies, will be discussed in
Section 2, the main empirical methodologies in Section 3, the data description and
empirical results in Section 4, and the conclusions in Section 5.
2. Overview of related literature
2.1. Definitions of contagion effect
Before an empirical investigation is conducted, 'contagionʼ must be defined first. The
World Bank has given contagion three definitions, namely, a broad definition, a
restrictive one, and a very restrictive one. The broad definition of contagion refers to
the cross-country transmission of shocks, or the general cross-country spillover
effects, as contagion does not need to be related to crises. The restrictive definition of
contagion refers to the transmission of shocks to other countries or the cross-country
correlation, beyond any fundamental link among the countries and beyond common
shocks. This definition is usually referred to as excess co-movement, commonly
explained by herding behavior. The very restrictive definition of contagion refers to
the occurrence of contagion when cross-country correlations increase during 'crisis
timesʼ relative to correlations during 'tranquil timesʼ (Nieh et al., 2011).
Why would economic and financial shocks transmit or spread from one country
to another? They eventually became international crises events, a main reason being
cross-country (or cross-economy) linkages.
The main economic theoretical bases of the empirical works in this study were the
theories of cross-country linkage channels and crisis contagion. In the economic the-
ory regarding the channel of cross-country linkage or impact transmission, there are
three main linkage channels between one country or economy and other countries
(economies), namely, the financial links, the real links, i.e., the links of real economy
or macro economy, and the political links. The financial links represented the cross-
country, cross-economy, or cross-market linkages occurring in the international
financial market system (Wong, 2000; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). The real links
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implied the cross-country linkages caused by fundamental factors, e.g., international
trade and foreign direct investment (Forbes, 2002). The political links represented the
cross-country linkages by political regimes. The transmission mechanism or propaga-
tion mechanism could be used to explain the cross-country linkage channels
(Edwards, 1998; Edwards, 2000; Kaufman, 2000).
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) expounded the transmission mechanism by using three
points, namely, the coordination on trade and policy, the re-evaluations of the
regimes of the countries, and the stochastic aggregate shocks, including shocks on
finance markets. Furthermore, they also stated the changes in the transmission mech-
anisms of exogenous shocks in the periods of tranquil times and crisis times by using
the two conceptions of multiple equilibrium and endogenous liquidity.
A crisis contagion theory explains that if there was co-movement or a common
trend between different markets, then a shock in one market would transmit to
another market. Dornbusch et al. (2000) defined contagion as a significant increase in
cross-market linkages after a shock to an individual country or market, as measured
by the degree to which asset prices or financial flows moved together across markets
relative to the co-movement in tranquil times. Forbes and Rigobon (2001) divided
how the shocks were propagated into two groups of theories: crisis-contingent and
non-crisis-contingent theories. Crisis-contingent theories are those that explain why
transmission mechanisms change during a crisis, and therefore, why cross-market
linkages increase after a shock. Non-crisis-contingent theories assume that transmis-
sion mechanisms are the same during a crisis or at more stable periods, and there-
fore, cross-market linkages do not increase after a shock (Nieh et al., 2011).
Kaminsky et al. (2003) redefined a contagion effect, as a strong 'immediate effectʼ
from a market to other markets after a filed crisis event, by using several previous
financial crises as references; they also pointed out that one of the main crisis trans-
mission mechanisms was international trade. In a word, if a market trend, the prices
or returns of assets, and/or volatilities of prices or returns is transmitted or spread
from one market to another after the collapse of a market, or during the period of a
crisis event, this phenomenon is called 'contagionʼ . This issue has been extensively
discussed in the context of international financial crises, e.g., Barassi et al. (2005),
Wang et al. (2007) for the monetary markets; Skintzi and Refenes (2006) and
Johansson (2008) for the bond markets; and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and
Syriopoulos (2007) for the stock markets. Our analysis in this study was based on the
very restrictive definition given by the World Bank.
The main purpose of this study was to investigate whether the variations had
existed in the channels or mechanisms of transmission between the U.S. stock market
and Asian, European, and American stock markets, i.e., the financial links, around
the subprime crisis between 2007 and 2010.
2.2. Empirical research of contagion effect
In empirical studies, Dornbusch et al. (2000) and Forbes and Rigobon (2001, 2002)
pointed out that four approaches had been utilised to measure how shocks were
transmitted internationally: cross-market correlation coefficients, ARCH or GARCH
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frameworks, co-integration techniques, and direct estimation of specific transmission
mechanisms by using the Probit model (Nieh et al., 2011; Nieh et al., 2012).
Many researchers considered that significant increases of correlation or co-move-
ment of the stock markets were the indicators of a contagion effect. King and
Wadhwani (1990), Lee and Kim (1993) and Cha and Oh (2000) used the correlation
approach and found that international stock markets had become more interrelated
after the 1987U.S. stock market crash and the 1997 Asian financial crisis, respectively.
The strengthening co-movement among international stock markets continued for a
longer period after these two crashes.
Hamao et al. (1990) utilised the GARCH model and found that there were volatil-
ity spillovers of the stock markets from New York to Tokyo, London to Tokyo, and
New York to London after the 1987U.S. stock market collapse. Edwards and Susmel
(2001) employed both the univariate and bivariate switching volatility models to ana-
lyse the behavior of volatility through time in Latin American countries, and they
showed that there existed short-lived high-volatility episodes, in general, lasting from
two to 12weeks, and the result supported the existence of volatility co-movements
across these countries. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argued that tests for contagion
based on cross-market correlation coefficients were problematic due to the bias intro-
duced by changing volatility in market returns (heteroskedasticity), and that under
the assumption of no omitted variables or endogeneity; it is possible to adjust this
bias. By using this adjustment, there were virtually no high levels of market co-move-
ment, which they called interdependence, i.e., no contagion, during the 1987U.S.
stock market collapse, the 1994 Mexican devaluation, and the 1997 Asian financial
crisis. Caporale et al. (2005) found the existence of contagion within the stock mar-
kets in Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Malaysia during the
1997 Asian financial crisis by using the conditional variance with the applications of
both heteroskedasticity and endogeneity biases, and invented a common shock to
deal with the omitted variable problem.
Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993) reported that co-integration relations did not exist
in the U.S. Dow Jones Index and France, Germany, and the U.K. stock markets before
the 1987U.S. stock market collapse; however, there were co-integration relations
between them after the U.S. stock market collapse. Sheng and Tu (2000) employed the
co-integration test and found that contagion effects existed in the U.S. stock market
and eleven Asian stock markets around the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Chen et al.
(2002) used the co-integration and ECM to investigate the dynamic interdependence
among the six major stock markets in Latin America, including Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela from 1995 to 2000, and found that there
existed dependency effects in prices; and they partitioned all the samples into the peri-
ods of pre- and during the Asian and Russian financial crises in 1997 and 1998,
respectively. Bekaert et al. (2005) also reported that co-integration relations did exist
among the Asian stock markets during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which demon-
strated a contagion effect. Therefore, based on the aforementioned studies, if co-inte-
gration exists across security markets, there will be a common trend among them.
In recent years, many scholars have researched the topics concerned with the sub-
prime crisis, the EMU sovereign-debt crisis, and the QE policy. Gorton (2009) was
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thorough in his work on the derivatives about the subprime mortgage loan, e.g.,
mortgage backed securities (MBS), collateralised debt obligations, (CDOs), credit
default swap (CDS), as well as their development processes, issue modes and struc-
tures. Longstaff (2010) discussed the contagion effect from the CDOs to the security
markets in the U.S. between 2006 and 2008; the ABX index of CDOs was employed
to examine whether the contagion effect existed in the mortgage bond market in this
study, and it was found that the contagion effect spread first from the lower credit
rating CDOs to the higher credit rating CDOs in the CDOs market, and then from
the CDOs market to the markets of treasury bills and stocks. Hui and Chung (2011)
discussed the transmission effect from the CDS market to other financial markets in
the Eurozone during the period of the EMU sovereign-debt crisis, and found that the
information flow in the CDS, futures, and options markets was the main cause, which
resulted in the spread of the crisis.
Similar research conducted by Aloui et al. (2011) found that there was strong evi-
dence of time-varying dependence between each of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India
and China) markets and the U.S. markets during the subprime crisis. Samarakoon
(2011) showed the evidence of contagion among the U.S. and frontier equity markets,
but not among the U.S. and emerging markets, by constructing various shock models.
Kenourgios and Padhi (2012) demonstrated that the evidence on stock markets
seemed to constitute a stronger transmission mechanism during the Russian default
crises, the Asian financial crises and the subprime crisis. Dimitriou et al. (2013) dis-
cussed financial contagion among the BRICS (BRIC and South Africa) and the U.S.
during the subprime crisis, and they showed that contagion appeared after the
Lehman Brothers’ collapse in almost all stock markets. Kenourgios (2014) reported
volatility contagion across the U.S. and European stock markets during the subprime
crisis and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, and their empirical evidence showed
that there was contagion in cross-market volatilities. Kenourgios and Dimitriou
(2015) investigated the contagion effects among ten sectors in six developed and
emerging regions during the subprime crisis (2007–2009), and they also pointed out
that the Lehman Brothers’ collapse marked the start of the most contagious phase.
Luchtenberg and Quang (2015) showed strong evidence that cross-market linkages
increased among many financial markets during the 2008 financial crisis.
Some studies regarding the impact of crisis events, including political and financial
crises, on eastern and southern European countries were as follows: Osinska et al.
(2016) compared the effects from political crises to the selected stocks in the U.S. and
Russian stock markets, including the indices of NYSE, NASDAQ and MOEX, around
the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, from the perspective of a market microstructure. They
indicated that the MOEX index lacked an appropriate transmission channel or mech-
anism from informed investors to the other markets. Guidi and Ugur (2013) indi-
cated that the correlation structures between the U.K., the U.S. and the southern and
eastern European equity markets had changed over time around the subprime crisis
between 2007 and 2009. Thalassinos et al. (2015) found that there existed different
channels of influence in the developed western European countries, the U.S. and
Japan, i.e., the mature capital markets, and in the southern and eastern European
emerging countries (Greece, Romania, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia) during the
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subprime crisis. Kizys and Pierdzioch (2011) found that the long-run linkages among
different stock markets had also changed over time. The long-run linkages between
the U.S. stock market and the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland stock markets
increased in fundamentals and speculative bubbles during the subprime crisis.
In the studies regarding the quantative easing (QE) policy of the U.S.,3 most of these
studies focused on the influence of QE on interest rates and bond yields in the U.S.,
emerging countries in Asia, and other developed countries, respectively (Neely, 2010;
Krishnamurthy et al., 2011; Hamilton and Wu, 2012; D’Amico and King, 2013; Jarrow
and Li, 2014; Cho and Rhee, 2014). Research indicated that the Fed purchased the
long-term government bonds and MBS, which could significantly reduce the interest
rates and bond yield rates in the U.S. bond market, e.g., Christensen and Rudebusch
(2012), Hamilton and Wu (2012), D’Amico and King (2013) and Kiley (2014) for gov-
ernment bond; Krishnamurthy et al. (2011) for corporate and agency bonds; and
Jarrow and Li (2014) for mortgage bonds. Guidolin et al. (2014) empirically investi-
gated the impact of QE on the U.S. corporate bond market and found corporate bond
yields were significantly lowered during the periods of QE1 and QE2; and they also
found that the investment grade (IG) bonds belonged to at least BBB- to Baa rankings.
3. Methodologies
3.1. The M-TAR model
The methodology frameworks in this study, including the Enders and Siklos (2001)
M-TAR model and the logistic smooth transition co-integration (LSTC) model, were
utilised in our earlier studies (Nieh et al., 2011, Nieh et al., 2012), and the M-TAR
model for threshold co-integration. Enders and Siklos (2001) extended the Engle and
Granger (1987) method to test asymmetric co-integration. First, the long-term equi-
librium relationship is as follows.
Yi;t ¼ g0 þ g1Xt þ ei;t i ¼ 1; 2 . . . . . . . . . : ; 23 (1)
In this study, we used the daily frequency data which enabled us to gather suffi-
cient sample sizes to conduct our empirical research. Where Yi;t was the logarithm of
the Asian, European and American stock indices for country i on period t, and i ¼
1; . . . ::; 23 represented the 23 countries in our study, respectively. Xt implied the
logarithm of the U.S. stock index, while t represented period t1 in the U.S. market,
which stood for the U.S. market versus the Asian and European markets, but period t
in the U.S. market, which stood for the U.S. market versus the American markets,
when the time lag of the trading day had to be considered (Eun and Shim, 1989; Liu
et al., 1998). ei;t measured the estimated residuals. The MTAR model was given as:
4
Det ¼ Htq1et1 þ ð1HtÞq2et1 þ
Xp1
i¼1 biDeti þ mt (2)
Ht ¼ 1 if Det1  r0 if Det1< r

(3)
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 2429
where Ht was the Heaviside indicator function, and r denoted the unknown threshold
value,5 and mt was the residual of the white-noise disturbance.
The null hypothesis of no co-integration (H0 : q1 ¼ q2 ¼ 0) was tested using spe-
cifically derived critical values provided by Enders and Siklos (2001). If the null of no
co-integration was rejected, the null of symmetric integration (H0 : q1 ¼ q2) could be
tested using a standard F-test.
3.2. The LSTC model
Furthermore, when we examined the 'asymmetric contagion effectʼ from the U.S.
stock market to Asian, European, and American stock markets during the period of
the subprime crisis, we also had to consider the problem of whether the transition
process of the threshold variable was a smooth transition between two regimes.
Therefore, we applied the Granger and Ter€asvirta (1993) and Ter€asvirta (1994, 1998)
logistic smooth transition regression (LSTR) technique to further extend the Enders
and Siklos (2001) M-TAR framework, which is called the logistic smooth transition
co-integration model. The long-term equilibrium relationships between the U.S. stock
market and the 23 stock markets were measured by ei;t , which was estimated via
OLS (1).
Next, we employed the foregoing model to test non-linear co-integration or asym-
metric co-integration with a logistic smooth transition process between our samples,
which was generalised from the Enders-Siklos M-TAR framework as:
Det ¼ q1et1 þ q2et1ð Þq Det1; c; rð Þ þ
Xp1
i¼1
biDeti þ xt (4)
With
q Det1 ; c; rð Þ ¼ 1þ exp c Det1  rð Þð Þ
 1
; c  0 (5)
where qðDet1;c; rÞ was the logistic smooth transition function, Det1 was the
threshold variable or transition variable, r was the threshold value or location param-
eter, xt was the residual of the white-noise disturbance (xt  iid (0, r2)), and c was
the smooth parameter or slope parameter in qðDet1;c; rÞ, which was employed to
measure the transition speed between two difference regimes.
Note that in this case of our study, Det1 was the lagged different error term.
Clearly, if c1, qi in the state dependent (4) changed monotonically with the inde-
pendent variable Det1 as (5) in (4) was a smooth continuous increasing function of
Det1 and took a value between 0 and 1, depending on the magnitude of Det1.
When Det1 ¼ r, the value of the transition function (qðDet1;c; rÞ) equaled to 0.5,
and the current regime was half way between the two extreme upper and lower
regimes. When Det1r was large and positive (Det1>r), the value of the transition
function equaled to 1, and Det was effectively generated by the linear mod-
elDet ¼ ðq1 þ q2Þet1 þ
Pp1
i¼1 biDeti þ xt; while when Det1r was large and nega-
tive (Det1<r), the value of the transition function qðDet1;c; rÞ approached 0, and
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Det was virtually generated by Det ¼ q1et1 þ
Pp1
i¼1 biDeti þ xt . The intermediate
value of Det1 provided a mixture of the two extreme regimes. Note that the M-TAR
model manifested a special case when smoothness parameter c approached infinity
in (5), qðDet1;c; rÞ became a Heaviside indicator function with qðDet1;c; rÞ ¼ 1
for all values of Det1 greater than r, and qðDet1;c; rÞ ¼ 0 otherwise, and (4)
became the M-TAR model. If c0, the value of the transition function equalled
0.5 regardless of whether Det1 r was positive, negative, or 0.
In the logistic smooth transition Enders-Siklos co-integration framework (4 and 5),
we could still employ the Enders and Siklos (2001) co-integration test to examine
the co-integration relationship; therefore, the no co-integration hypothesis
(H0 : q1 ¼ q2 ¼ 0) was tested using specifically derived critical values provided by
Enders and Siklos (2001).
When c approached zero, (4) became the linear AR(p) model, implying that the
AR model was nested in the logistic smooth transition Enders-Siklos co-integration
model. Therefore, our first step in specifying the model was to test linearity against
the logistic smooth transition Enders-Siklos co-integration model form. If the null of
linearity could not be rejected, we could conclude that the AR model adequately rep-
resented the data generating process. However, if linearity was rejected, we would
continue to estimate the highly non-linear logistic smooth transition Enders-Siklos
co-integration model form using the non-linear least squares (NLLS) approach. From
(4) and (5), it could be observed that testing H0 : c ¼ 0 was a non-standard testing
problem since (4) was identified only under the alternative H1 : c 6¼ 0. Thus, standard
t- and F-testing methods were not appropriate steps to arrive at a model choice.
Therefore, this study followed Luukkonen et al. (1988) to compute a first- and third-
order Taylor series approximation to the ð 1þ exp ðcðDet1  rÞÞÞ1 under the
null of c ¼ 0.in (4)
When a third-order Taylor series approximation was used, the expanded and re-
parameterised equation was:
Det ¼ aþ b1e0t1 þ b2 Det1ð Þ þ b3 Det1ð Þ2 þ b4 Det1ð Þ3
þ b5e0t1 Det1ð Þ þ b6e0t1 Det1ð Þ2 þ b7e0t1 Det1ð Þ3 þ xt
(6)
The possible way to identify the appropriate model, the linear co-integration
model, and the logistic smooth transition co-integration model was through a
sequence of test parameter values from (6), (Woodward and Marisetty, 2005). Thus,
we believe that the linearity test was identical to testing the joint restriction that all
non-linear terms were zero in the null hypothesis, which was as follows:
H0 : bi ¼ 0 i ¼ 2; . . . ::7 (7)
In (7), if H0 was not rejected, we would select the linear co-integration model. If
H0 was rejected, we would select the logistic smooth transition co-integration model.
In recent years, more advanced econometric models have been employed in the
research on the topics of the linkage or correlations of international equity markets.
For example, the asymmetric generalised dynamic conditional correlation (AG-DCC)
GARCH models, the rolling window sub-sample Granger causality test and the
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dynamic copulas with and without regime-switching (Cappiello et al., 2006; Jondeau
and Rockinger, 2006; Okimoto, 2008; Balcilar et al., 2010; Kenourgios et al., 2011).
However, the basics of these models are substantially different from the three models
in our study (Engle-Granger, Enders-Siklos, LSTC). The three models built the co-
integration relationships and the asymmetric adjustments of co-integration relation-
ships on the residuals of linear equations between the two stock market variables in
our study.
The comparison of the differences between the results of the traditional co-integra-
tion method, i.e., the symmetric co-integration method, and the asymmetric co-inte-
gration method, was one of the main motivations and objectives in our study.
Moreover, the Engle-Granger ADF co-integration framework is a special version of
the Enders-Siklos threshold co-integration framework (Enders and Siklos, 2001), and
the Enders-Siklos threshold co-integration model (including M-TAR model) is a spe-
cial version of the LSTC model. Therefore, we attempted to build a benchmark of
comparison by using the Engle-Granger model, the Enders-Siklos M-TAR model and
the LSTC model in our study due to the fact that the three co-integration models
possess similar basics, yet there are differences among them.
4. Data and empirical results
4.1. Data description
This part of the study was conducted by researching the U.S., Asian, European, and
north and south American stock markets. The Standard & Poor 500 (S&P 500) index
was used in the U.S.; seven major stock markets were used in Asia: Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Singapore, Japan, Korea, India, and China; twelve major stock markets in
Europe: U.K., Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Russia,
Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Turkey; and four major stock markets in
north and south America: Canada, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. All observations
were taken as logarithms.6 The trade stocks in the S&P 500 Index included the top
500 enterprises in the NYSE and AMEX, and the total market value of the S&P 500
Index dominated over 80% of the total value of the NYSE.7. In addition, after taking
factors such as liquidity and industrial representation into consideration, we believed
that this index could reflect the conditions of the capital markets, the security mar-
kets, and the economy of the U.S more validly than the Dow Jones Index (Nieh
et al., 2011).
The entire sample period was from 1 September, 2005 to 31 March 2010, a total of
730 daily observations were obtained for each variable.8 Bannigidadmath and
Narayan (2016) indicated that daily data were better than weekly or monthly data as
the former provided much more information than the latter. Trading days and clos-
ing days were different in various stock markets; therefore, if one market did not
have any transaction on a particular day, we would delete the data in other markets
on the same day. We only kept the data of synchronised trading days in all stock
markets. Hamao et al. (1990) pointed out that discarding the data of non-synchron-
ised trading days would not affect the accuracy of the empirical results.
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Since there is still no consensus on the start date for the subprime crisis, it is not
easy to determine an exact date. In general, scholars (Gorton, 2009; Sikka et al., 2009;
Claessens et al., 2010; Longstaff, 2010) and the financial industry considered the
report of the financial crisis of the New Century Financial Corp. as the beginning of
the crisis. The Lehman Brothers’ filing for bankruptcy on 15 September 2008 aggra-
vated the subprime crisis, which also caused the degree of severity of the crisis to rise
to a higher level (Swan, 2009; Longstaff, 2010; Sobreira, 2011; Afonso et al., 2012;
Frankel and Saravelos, 2012; Dumontaux and Pop, 2013; Song and Zhu, 2018). In
addition, the U.S. Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilisation Act
(EESA), which included the 700 billion dollars 'Troubled Asset Relief Programʼ
(TARP) on 4 October 2008. The negative effects of the subprime crisis on the U.S.
and global stock markets were different between the two periods, namely, between
2007 and 2008 and between 2009 and 2010. Longstaff (2010) pointed out that the
subprime crisis could be divided into two sections in the timeline, the first section
being earlier in 2007, and the reason was that the institutional investors, e.g., Bear
Stearns, Merrill Lynch, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), suffered huge losses
due to their investment in subprime debts or derivatives. The second section began at
the end of 2008, and the reason was that the global financial system continued to
deflate currency due to the elimination of the huge subprime mortgage debts by insti-
tutions, enterprises, and governments. Therefore, in order to assure the consistency
in our study, we used the date on which the trading of stocks of New Century
Financial Corp. were terminated in the NYSE, i.e., 13 March 2007, as the first cutting
point, and the date on which Lehman Brothers filed their bankruptcy, i.e., 15
September 2008, as the second cutting point. Thus, the 'pre-subprime crisisʼ period
was defined as 1 September, 2005 to 13 March 2007, and the first section of the 'dur-
ing the subprime crisisʼ period was defined as 14 March 2007 to 15 September, 2008.
The second section of the 'during the subprime crisisʼ period was defined as the
period from 16 September 2008 to 31 March 2010. We, therefore, compared the esti-
mated results of the different periods. The returns of stock price indices—which were
the logarithms of after the first difference—were employed in our study. The stock
price index returns were as follows:
DLIPi;t ¼ ln IPi;t ln IPi;t1ð Þ  100
Where LIPi;t ¼ ln IPi;t, IPi;t was the 24 stock markets in this study.
Table 1 represents the summary statistics for all the returns in our study, and
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrated the time trends of logarithms of the stock indices and
the stock index returns in 24 stock markets, respectively. In Figure 1, there were
downward trends in 24 stock indices, and in Figure 2, there was a substantial increase
in the variation of returns in the 24 stock markets during the period between the
second half of 2007 and the first half of 2009. The results of the three unit root tests,
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF; 1984), Phillips and Perron (1988) and Kwiatkowski
et al. (1992), were summarised in Table 2, which showed that all the stock indices
variables were the Ið1Þ type series. Table 3 represents the results of the KSS’s (2003)
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ESTAR unit root test, which showed that variables of all stock indices in this study
were non-linear Ið1Þ series at the 1% significance level.
Because the correlation analysis of volatility of the stock index returns was
employed to investigate the contagion or transmission effect in this study, i.e., volatil-
ity spillover effects of returns, we used the ARMA(p,q)-GARCH(1,1) model to fit the
conditional variance, i.e., the volatility of returns; therefore, we first applied the
ARCH-LM test to investigate the heteroscedasticity of the conditional variance in
returns. Table 4 represents the results of the ARCH-LM test for the volatility of
returns in the period of the pre-subprime crisis hTable 4-(1)i, the first section (sec-
tion I) of the period of during the subprime crisis hTable 4-(2)i, and the second sec-
tion (section II) of the period of during the subprime crisis hTable 4-(3)i for all the
returns in our study. In Table 4, when the residuals of the ARMA (p, q) model by
the ARCH-LM test were examined, the null hypothesis of no GARCH effect was
rejected at the 10% significance level in the three periods. Therefore, the use of the
GARCH (1, 1) modelling to extract the values of the return volatility was
appropriate.
Tables 5 and 6 represent the results of the non-conditional correlation coefficients
of returns and the volatility of returns, and the t statistics for them between the U.S.
and Asian, European, and north and south American stock markets in the three peri-
ods around the subprime crisis, respectively, and Figure 3 shows the volatility of
returns in the 24 stock markets.9 In Figure 3, there was also a substantial increase in
the volatility of returns in the 24 stock markets during the period between the second
Table 1. Summary statistics for returns on stock indices.
Mean Max. Min. Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera L-B Q(24)
U.S. 0.0058 9.4008 13.7989 1.7620 1.1333 12.9836 3183.57 71.121
Taiwan 0.0355 16.0768 8.6118 1.9099 0.4635 12.2064 2600.59 47.536
Hong Kong 0.0457 16.8007 15.9720 2.2348 0.0443 12.6007 2800.00 33.436
Singapore 0.0311 21.4742 10.6280 1.8763 1.5415 29.0798 20948.4 60.251
Japan 0.0175 10.4443 12.7154 2.0453 0.8374 10.6384 1857.41 31.335
Korea 0.0572 12.2022 10.3569 1.9303 0.2664 8.5982 960.578 55.576
India 0.1093 14.4126 19.2130 2.5200 0.4667 10.3469 1666.02 43.573
China 0.1319 12.9508 14.1681 2.6477 0.1084 6.4357 359.981 47.821
U.K. 0.0088 9.8239 10.3277 1.7655 0.4009 9.4707 1291.34 68.352
Germany 0.0330 9.9765 13.1888 1.9008 0.7766 10.6697 1860.08 21.221
France 0.0141 10.7906 11.4762 1.9252 0.5351 9.1899 1198.59 56.342
Netherlands 0.0169 9.7823 12.6138 2.0016 0.7195 10.2985 1680.90 38.831
Belgium 0.0269 9.2213 9.9459 1.8606 0.6363 8.8201 1078.11 35.132
Norway 0.0227 11.9993 16.1667 2.4705 0.9904 11.6661 2400.38 36.532
Sweden 0.0270 9.7707 12.3201 1.9631 0.2785 8.7045 997.884 37.912
Russia 0.0750 20.2039 39.4545 3.7855 1.7126 26.6124 17291.7 73.232
Poland 0.0389 12.5164 10.7798 2.0651 0.2878 9.0639 1126.98 23.012
Czech Republic 0.0200 18.3075 14.3608 2.2370 0.0083 15.4256 4689.76 39.831
Hungary 0.0111 13.8357 12.6489 2.4742 0.1677 8.2123 828.640 47.116
Turkey 0.0794 12.9258 15.8297 2.7011 0.3758 8.8641 1061.67 23.131
Canada 0.0152 8.7092 16.9985 1.8251 1.2746 16.7947 5977.53 43.813
Mexico 0.1114 10.1536 16.2775 2.0377 0.6426 11.2361 2110.61 38.991
Argentina 0.0547 13.5275 17.3134 2.5768 0.5335 11.5791 2270.18 41.523
Brazil 0.1249 12.3491 18.7490 2.5765 0.7074 10.4282 1736.84 48.233
Source: Notes: 1. The period, and sample sizes for the entire period, were 1 September 2005 and 31 March 2010
with a total of 730 daily observations.
2. ,  and  denoted significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
3. Jarque-Bera is the statistic of the normal test.
4. L-B Q is the statistics of Ljung-Box Q.
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half of 2007 and the first half of 2009. In particular, it reached the peak during 2008
and 2009, which showed that higher and persistent fluctuations could be observed
since the eruption of the subprime crisis; the phenomenon also demonstrated that the
negative impact of the subprime crisis on the stock markets in various countries was
very severe. In Tables 5 and 6, the results showed that both the correlation
Figure 1. Logarithms of the stock indices in 24 stock markets. Source:
Figure 2. The stock index returns in 24 stock markets. Source:
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coefficients of returns and the volatility of returns increased significantly between the
U.S. and most of the Asian, European, and north and south American markets (but
not the Chinese stock market) during the subprime crisis, especially in Section II after
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on 15 September 2008. The results in Table 6
also represented that there were volatility spillovers between the U.S. stock market
and the aforementioned stock markets, and the results in Tables 5 and 6 supported
the crisis-contagion theory by Dornbusch et al. (2000) and Forbes and
Rigobon (2001).
4.2. The empirical results
In this part, we employed the Engle and Granger (1987) co-integration test to exam-
ine the symmetric long-run equilibrium relationships, i.e., co-integration relation-
ships, and the Enders and Siklos (2001) M-TAR model and the logistic smooth
transition co-integration model, respectively, to investigate the changes in the asym-
metric co-integration relationships between the U.S. S&P 500 Index and 23 stock
markets in Asia, Europe, and north and south America around the subprime crisis
between 2007 and 2010.
Table 2. Results of various unit root tests.
Level First difference
ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS
U.S. 1.0186(2) 1.0167 1.8152 12.3351(1) 30.6521 0.1724
Taiwan 1.4126(5) 1.4712 0.4861 16.9521(3) 30.3353 0.1673
Hong Kong 1.6721(5) 1.6823 0.6129 15.7632(3) 31.5832 0.1215
Singapore 1.2981(3) 1.3367 0.5212 14.9682(0) 29.3354 0.1516
Japan 1.2023(5) 1.1723 1.8642 14.2311(2) 29.7723 0.1882
Korea 1.8735(3) 1.9737 0.5328 15.9823(1) 32.0213 0.1232
India 1.7863(1) 1.8803 1.0234 15.4236(1) 29.3137 0.1216
China 1.5322(2) 1.5673 1.2232 14.0025(3) 31.1202 0.2028
U.K. 1.3861(3) 1.4762 3.1431 21.2436(4) 48.4212 0.1221
Germany 1.4823(2) 1.4827 5.1321 21.9712(3) 48.1215 0.1092
France 1.7354(5) 1.7512 2.8052 20.1563(1) 50.3561 0.2213
Netherlands 1.5562(6) 1.5832 1.7329 18.9329(5) 49.3736 0.1721
Belgium 1.2987(4) 1.2876 0.9754 22.1439(2) 47.5543 0.1643
Norway 1.6651(3) 1.6823 2.3352 20.7751(6) 47.2108 0.1987
Sweden 1.9723(3) 1.9416 2.7853 21.3542(0) 48.2522 0.1923
Russia 1.4123(1) 1.5113 2.4216 28.8239(1) 28.8121 0.2317
Poland 1.2602(0) 1.3641 3.1337 26.7752(2) 26.6743 0.3023
Czech Republic 1.1216(1) 1.1227 3.6531 30.9231(3) 30.2251 0.2822
Hungary 1.2982(2) 1.3178 1.9778 28.6537(2) 28.6521 0.2667
Turkey 1.3782(0) 1.3796 0.6376 33.6457(3) 33.6681 0.2523
Canada 1.7621(6) 1.8762 3.9329 23.9832(3) 50.7646 0.1843
Mexico 0.8939(5) 0.7982 4.6732 21.9812(7) 47.8326 0.1424
Argentina 1.0923(3) 1.1941 4.3937 22.7523(2) 45.8823 0.2132
Brazil 1.2531(7) 0.9578 3.6897 23.9513(6) 42.8532 0.1032
Source: Notes: 1.  denoted significance at the 1% significance levels, respectively; the numbers in the parentheses
were the appropriate lag-lengths selected by minimising AIC.
2. The critical values for the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels of ADF, PP and KPSS were (2.5679, 2.8637,
3.4354), (2.5679, 2.8637, 3.4354) and (0.3470, 0.4630, 0.7390).
3. The null hypothesis of ADF and PP were non-stationary (unit root), and the null of KPSS was stationary (non-
unit root).
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Table 7 represented the results of the Engle-Granger co-integration relationships
between the U.S. and the 23 stock markets in the three periods around the subprime cri-
sis. The null hypothesis of no co-integration is also shown in Table 7. In Table 7-(1), the
results of the Engle-Granger ADF statistics show that there were co-integration relation-
ships between the S&P 500 Index and the U.K., Germany, Norway, Czech Republic and
Hungary stock markets at the 10% significance level in the period of the pre-subprime cri-
sis. In Table 7-(2), the results show that there was a co-integration relationship between
the U.S. stock market and Mexico stock market at the 5% significance level in Section I of
the period of during the subprime crisis. In Table 7-(3), the results show that there was
only a co-integration relationship between the U.S. stock market and stock markets in
Germany, Netherlands and Hungary at the 10% significance level in Section II of the
period of during the subprime crisis. The results in Table 7 show that there was only sig-
nificant increase in the co-integration relationship between the S&P 500 Index and the
German DAX Index around the subprime crisis; this result was not consistent with the
results of the correlation analyses of returns and the volatility of returns in Tables 5 and 6,
and it did not support the crisis-contagion theory by Dornbusch et al. (2000) and Forbes
and Rigobon (2001).
Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001) proposed two models for
the threshold co-integration test, namely, the TAR model and the M-TAR model.
This study adopted the M-TAR model. Enders and Granger (1998) believed that
when asymmetrical adjustments occurred in the data series, the determination of the
Table 3. Results of the non-linear unit root test – the KSS test.


























Source: Notes: 1. The numbers in the parentheses were the appropriate lag-lengths selected by minimising AIC.
2. The simulated critical values for different Ks were tabulated in Kapetanios et al. (2003).
3.  denoted significance at the 1% significance level.
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Heaviside indicator function might also be decided by the first difference value of
the error correction term on period t1 (Det1). Boucher (2007) indicated that the
speed of convergence of parameter estimation by using the M-TAR model would be
faster than that of the TAR model. Table 8 represents the results of our estimation
of the threshold co-integration relationships between the U.S. stock market and the
23 stock markets in the three periods around the subprime crisis. The null hypoth-
esis of no co-integration (FC) and symmetric adjustment (FA) was also shown in
Table 8. In Table 8-(1), both FC and FA demonstrates the relationships of asymmet-
ric co-integration between the U.S. stock market and the stock markets in India,
France, Norway, Czech Republic, Hungary, Canada, and Mexico, in the period of
pre-subprime crisis. In Table 8-(2), the FC statistics reject the null hypothesis at the
1% significant level, and the FA statistics rejecd the null at the 10% level in Section
I during the subprime crisis—except in the Chinese stock market. Both FC and FA
demonstrated the asymmetric co-integration relationships between the U.S. stock
market and most of the 23 stock markets in Section I, during the subprime crisis—
except in the Chinese stock market. In Table 8-(3), both FC and FA demonstrate the
asymmetric co-integration relationships between the U.S. market, and most of all
the stock markets—except the China stock market—in Section II of the period dur-
ing the subprime crisis.
Table 4. ARMA (p, q)-GARCH (1, 1) modeling and results of the ARCH-LM test for the volatility
of returns.




j¼1 cjetj þ et , ht ¼ a0 þ a1e2t1 þ a2ht1
(1) Pre-subprime
crisis (2005, 9, 12007,
3, 13; T¼ 244)
(2) Section I of during the
subprime crisis (2007, 3,
142008, 9, 15; T¼ 248)
(3) Section II of during the
subprime crisis (2008, 9,
162010, 3, 31; T¼ 238)
F-statistics TR2 F-statistics TR2 F-statistics TR2
U.S. 2.9712 14.3562 20.1212 17.9894 18.2434 78.9953
Taiwan 2.8724 4.9998 12.1534 13.2317 12.3326 61.7356
Hong Kong 5.9923 6.1213 5.8634 18.4356 23.1022 32.9834
Singapore 3.9893 17.2512 23.3323 27.1129 10.4135 52.1521
Japan 3.9983 8.2138 22.7563 24.3128 13.9459 31.2363
Korea 4.2313 4.7643 10.3015 12.2003 11.7011 32.7868
India 2.5621 5.2098 3.3423 6.2397 4.9129 28.0012
China 2.7802 5.7723 5.3108 6.2543 6.8657 32.8912
U.K. 8.2523 15.2854 13.8423 15.8821 8.9081 34.0024
Germany 6.9881 16.3347 8.8854 15.2231 6.2132 39.8729
France 3.3223 3.4026 12.1839 14.0034 7.9217 51.3342
Netherlands 4.2723 10.2839 8.3562 8.2132 8.8651 39.1121
Belgium 3.2936 7.8972 13.3532 11.4453 14.0021 28.5638
Norway 7.8814 8.2563 10.2123 15.3857 7.0131 43.3342
Sweden 7.8218 7.9839 12.1216 23.8754 5.0213 32.7982
Russia 4.3351 8.2324 9.3342 10.1865 14.4351 29.1872
Poland 4.7964 4.6764 4.5332 8.3521 10.7238 30.2543
Czech Republic 2.5412 5.1782 5.5221 14.3354 13.8124 27.2215
Hungary 2.7657 5.7021 10.2523 17.2452 8.3023 28.6759
Turkey 8.1326 5.3075 15.3125 16.3263 8.9879 33.0324
Canada 2.1012 9.8778 13.2328 15.8123 9.8211 51.7163
Mexico 4.8921 7.9521 7.2533 20.2133 6.8452 46.5562
Argentina 2.1016 2.6081 10.8429 10.9823 13.1754 73.4118
Brazil 5.5121 5.5113 13.2137 13.2087 10.2313 37.6857
Source: Notes: 1. The volatility of returns was measured by the conditional variance of returns from the ARMA (p, q)-
GARCH (1, 1) model and the lag-lengths of the ARMA (p, q) model selected by minimising AIC.
2. ,  and  denoted significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Table 5. Results of non-conditional correlation coefficients of returns.



















Taiwan 0.2298 0.2861 0.3362 0.6650 0.6077 1.8634
Hong Kong 0.2101 0.3752 0.4883 1.9971 1.5263 3.4965
Singapore 0.1817 0.3882 0.4723 2.4904 1.1319 3.5918
Japan 0.1928 0.2983 0.3491 1.2390 0.6217 1.8453
Korea 0.2141 0.3411 0.4179 1.5197 0.9836 2.4835
India 0.2018 0.3507 0.4936 1.7816 1.9119 3.6672
China 0.0733 0.0853 0.0931 0.1331 0.0861 0.2175
U.K. 0.4334 0.4851 0.6889 0.7226 3.4633 4.1644
Germany 0.4741 0.5201 0.6562 0.6738 2.2959 2.9535
France 0.4601 0.4898 0.6211 0.4228 2.0918 2.5018
Netherlands 0.3093 0.4321 0.6391 1.5729 3.2218 4.7654
Belgium 0.4012 0.4597 0.6398 0.7920 2.8574 3.6297
Norway 0.3308 0.4221 0.6402 1.1741 3.3762 4.5244
Sweden 0.3241 0.4138 0.6387 1.1459 3.4585 4.5786
Russia 0.1908 0.3123 0.4212 1.4321 1.3806 2.7922
Poland 0.2012 0.4021 0.5931 2.4488 2.8068 5.2189
Czech 0.2081 0.3525 0.4713 1.7317 1.5710 3.2784
Hungary 0.1838 0.3367 0.4824 1.8127 1.9247 3.7108
Turkey 0.2315 0.3964 0.5002 2.0237 1.4260 3.4229
Canada 0.3611 0.5138 0.7001 2.0913 3.2814 5.3377
Mexico 0.4171 0.5478 0.8130 1.8854 5.7015 7.5443
Argentina 0.3751 0.4809 0.6898 1.4308 3.5421 4.9438
Brazil 0.4062 0.5306 0.7992 1.7628 5.5353 7.2574
Notes: ,  and  denoted significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Table 6. Results of correlation coefficients of volatility of returns.
Correlation coefficients
of volatility of returns
Test of correlation coefficients



















Taiwan 0.4172 0.6054 0.7263 2.8364 2.4010 5.1982
Hong Kong 0.5218 0.8433 0.8902 7.2051 2.0853 9.2071
Singapore 0.4002 0.7012 0.7054 4.9134 0.0910 4.9531
Japan 0.3892 0.8693 0.9142 10.1334 2.4348 12.4531
Korea 0.4323 0.8642 0.9122 9.3357 2.5274 11.7560
India 0.3812 0.5746 0.6198 2.7876 0.7701 3.5256
China 0.1098 0.5103 0.3823 4.9919 1.7565 3.1906
U.K. 0.7436 0.9302 0.9902 7.7309 10.9185 18.5250
Germany 0.7893 0.9100 0.9967 5.0477 18.3463 23.2674
France 0.6201 0.9298 0.9952 10.2700 14.8733 24.9765
Netherlands 0.5134 0.9411 0.9972 13.0091 16.8372 29.6432
Belgium 0.5912 0.9523 0.9982 12.9667 18.0730 30.8321
Norway 0.6502 0.8825 0.9981 6.7381 22.9127 29.4883
Sweden 0.6894 0.9288 0.9973 8.8484 18.1100 26.7934
Russia 0.3712 0.5062 0.8675 1.8495 8.3814 10.1778
Poland 0.4722 0.5746 0.8164 1.5593 5.3836 6.9050
Czech Republic 0.4931 0.6523 0.8837 2.6359 6.7149 9.2963
Hungary 0.4231 0.5868 0.8806 2.4394 7.7285 10.1113
Turkey 0.5002 0.5986 0.8064 1.5584 4.6621 6.1856
Canada 0.7523 0.9623 0.9991 10.9989 20.5549 31.3565
Mexico 0.6410 0.9287 0.9961 9.7987 16.1010 25.7329
Argentina 0.7101 0.8920 0.9907 5.9988 13.7064 19.5875
Brazil 0.6654 0.9062 0.9710 7.7532 6.6112 14.2572
Source: Note: ,  and  denoted significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Finally, we investigated how the asymmetric adjustment and the smooth transition
phenomenon influenced the transmission or contagion effect by applying the logistic
smooth transition co-integration (LSTC) model to compare the transmission or contagion
Figure 3. The volatility of returns in 24 stock markets. Source:















Taiwan 1.512 1.132 2.358
Hong Kong 0.897 1.423 2.231
Singapore 1.112 2.564 2.653
Japan 2.102 2.581 2.434
Korea 0.903 2.401 2.314
India 0.273 1.773 2.515
China 0.878 0.674 2.132
U.K. 3.262 2.403 3.018
Germany 3.407 2.542 4.121
France 2.423 2.402 2.333
Netherlands 2.246 1.522 3.201
Belgium 2.119 1.248 2.102
Norway 3.783 1.524 2.628
Sweden 2.312 1.754 2.334
Russia 2.232 0.878 2.521
Poland 2.654 2.203 2.657
Czech Republic 3.613 2.322 2.898
Hungary 3.212 2.387 3.322
Turkey 1.834 2.102 2.486
Canada 1.521 2.646 2.802
Mexico 1.373 3.672 1.786
Argentina 1.335 2.902 1.248
Brazil 0.298 2.542 1.723
Source: Notes: 1. The lag-length of difference Ks selected by minimising AIC.
2. The critical values of the Engle-Granger ADF statistics were taken from Engle and Yoo (1987).
3. ,  and  denoted significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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effect from the U.S. stock market to the 23 stock markets in the three periods of pre- and
during the subprime crisis.
Table 9 represents the results of the Enders-Siklos M-TAR co-integration test in
the logistic smooth transition regressive (LSTR) framework and linearity test for the
co-integration relationships between the U.S. stock market and the 23 stock
markets in the three periods around the subprime crisis. The null hypothesis of no
co-integration (FC:q1 ¼ q2 ¼ 0) and linearity model (FL:b2 ¼ . . . ¼ b7 ¼ 0) is shown
in Table 9. In Table 9-(1), both FC and FL demonstrate the relationships of logistic
smooth transition co-integration between the U.S. stock market and the stock markets
in Hong Kong, India, Germany, France, Czech Republic, Hungary, Canada, and
Mexico, in the period of pre-subprime crisis. In Table 9-(2), both FC and FL demon-
strate the logistic smooth transition co-integration relationships between the U.S.
stock market and most of all the stock markets in Section I of during the subprime
crisis except the stock market in China . In Table 9-(3), both FC and FL demonstrate
the logistic smooth transition co-integration relationships between the U.S. market
and most of all the stock markets in our study except in China, in Section II of dur-
ing the subprime crisis.
By comparing the FC statistics in Tables 8 and 9 further, we find that the co-inte-
gration relationships had significantly increased after the shock of the subprime crisis,
including Sections I and II of during the subprime crisis, between the U.S. market
and most of the Asian, European, and American stock markets except the stock mar-
kets in China and Brazil in Table 8, and except the stock market in China in Table 9;
and there existed a trend of escalation in the FC statistics from Section I to Section II.
The results of both Table 8 and Table 9 show that there were 'contagionʼ or 'trans-
missionʼ effects between the U.S. market and most of the Asian, European, and
American stock markets during the period of the subprime crisis, especially in
Section II of the subprime crisis, which was after Lehman Brothers filed for bank-
ruptcy on 15 September 2008. Dimitriou et al. (2013) pointed out that contagion
appeared after the Lehman Brothers’ collapse in almost all stock markets. Kenourgios
and Dimitriou (2015) also indicated that the Lehman Brothers’ collapse marked the
start of the most contagious phase during the subprime crisis. However, there was
only an 'interdependence effectʼ between the U.S. market and the stock markets in
China and Brazil in Table 8, and between the U.S. market and the Chinese stock
market in Table 9. Forbes and Rigobon (2001) defined the contagion of the inter-
national stock markets as a significant increase in cross-market linkages or co-move-
ment between one market and others after a shock or during a crisis, and our results
supported the 'contagion effectʼ between the U.S. stock market and some of the stock
markets in the surveyed countries in our study.
By comparing the FA statistics in Table 8-(1), 8-(2) and 8-(3) further, we found
that the asymmetry in the co-integration relationships had also significantly increased
during the period of the crisis, including Sections I and II, between the U.S. stock
market and most of the 23 stock markets except in China, and there also existed a
trend of escalation in the FA statistics from Section I to Section II. The result shows
that the subprime crisis induced the quick transmission of massive negative informa-
tion among many stock markets, especially in Section II of the subprime crisis, which
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also showed that the event of Lehman Brothers’ filing for bankruptcy aggravated not
only the subprime crisis but also the panic of the investors in the financial markets.
All of these led to higher risk aversion for international investors.
The results of the FL statistics in Table 9 were also similar to those in Table 8,
which demonstrate that the co-integration relationships were asymmetric or non-lin-
ear, and the order of the ranks of the stock market co-integration relationship
between the aforementioned stock markets and the U.S. stock market was also similar
to that in Table 8. Moreover, by comparing the FL statistics and the smooth param-
eter (c) in Tables 9-(1), 9-(2) and 9-(3) further, we found that the transition speed of
co-integration relationships between the difference regimes had also conspicuously
increased during the period of the crisis between the U.S. stock market and most of
the Asian, European, and American stock markets—except the stock market in
China—especially in Section II of the subprime crisis. The results confirmed the con-
clusion in Table 8, which show that the subprime crisis (especially after the event of
Lehman Brothers’ filing for bankruptcy) aggravated the panic of the investors to the
negative information in the financial market, and induced the quick transmission of
massive negative information among many stock markets. All of these also led to
higher risk aversion for international investors.
According to the empirical results in Tables 8 and 9, the order of the ranks of the stock
market co-integration relationship between the aforementioned stock markets and the
U.S. stock market was as follows: the countries in Europe (the order of the ranks: France,
the U.K., Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, Czech
Republic, Russia and Turkey), the countries in north and south America (the order of the
ranks: Canada, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil), and the countries in Asia (the order of the
ranks: Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, India, and China).
This could be explained with the fact that the financial markets in western and
northern European countries, and Canada, Singapore, Japan and Hong Kong, i.e., the
mature capital markets, were relatively advanced markets and had more linkage with
the U.S. financial and security markets, whereas the financial markets in Latin
America and developing countries in Asia and eastern Europe were emerging markets
and had less linkage with the U.S. financial markets.
The contagion effects on western and northern European and advanced Asian
equity markets were stronger than those on the equity markets in Latin America,
eastern Europe and developing countries in Asia. In the past, most of the financial
crises originated from the countries, which were considered to be emerging markets
with a lot of foreign debt, weak financial institutions, and unsound financial supervis-
ory systems. The neighbouring countries were apt to be influenced because of their
close geographical locations to the origin of a financial crisis. However, the subprime
crisis was due to the huge losses of credit derivatives in the U.S. financial and secur-
ities markets. It originated from the most advanced country and no one expected this
could happen. Surprisingly, the most severely influenced markets were not the neigh-
bouring Latin American, eastern European and Asian emerging markets. Therefore,
the extent of financial linkage with the U.S. market might be the explanatory factor
of the strength of the contagion effect. Because many financial institutions and invest-
ors held a lot of subprime mortgage securities in the countries in western Europe,
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Canada, Singapore, Japan and Hong Kong, it was reasonable that the contagion
effects were more significant in these markets than in the Latin American, eastern
European and Asian emerging markets. In short, the origins and impact of the sub-
prime crisis were different from those of the financial crises in emerging markets.
5. Conclusions
The crisis contagion theory states that exogenous shocks are transmitted to many
countries through transmission mechanisms. This effect leads to co-movement of
stock markets. Dornbusch et al. (2000) and Forbes and Rigobon (2001) pointed
out that contagion effects exist when negative impacts occurred during the crisis.
Co-integration relationships between stock markets represent market co-movement
or common trends, and co-integration analysis is widely used to investigate whether
or not the long-term equilibrium relationship between stock markets is changed
when a financial crisis happens. If the equilibrium relationship changes, the contagion
effect occurs. However, the traditional symmetric co-integration analysis ignored the
characteristics of asymmetric adjustment in stock markets (Li and Lam, 1995;
Koutmos, 1998; Sarantis, 2001; Chiang, 2001). Therefore, we employed the Enders
and Siklos (2001) threshold co-integration framework, including the M-TAR model
and the logistic smooth transition regressive (LSTR) method proposed by Granger
and Ter€asvirta (1993) and Ter€asvirta (1994, 1998), which was the expansion of the
M-TAR model and allows asymmetric adjustments and smooth transitions, when
analysing stock market relationships. We tested the asymmetric long-term equilibrium
relationship between the U.S. stock market and 23 stock markets in Asia, Europe,
and north and south America around the subprime crisis.
In this study, we anticipated contagion effects among international stock markets
would lead to co-integration between the U.S. and Asian, European, and north and
south American stock markets. However, the results of the Engle and Granger (1987)
co-integration test did not indicate co-integration relationships between the U.S. and
these stock markets. These results were not consistent with the correlation analyses of
returns and the volatility of returns, for the correlation coefficients of returns and the
volatility of returns both increased. In addition, these results were different from pre-
vious empirical studies, and our assumption could not be verified by traditional co-
integration methods. Furthermore, the test results of the Enders-Siklos threshold co-
integration model and the logistic smooth transition co-integration model did indi-
cate that co-integration relationships increased. Therefore, the models of threshold
co-integration and logistic smooth transition co-integration were better methods to
analyse dynamic stock market relationships.
There are several major findings in this study. First of all, the empirical results
supported previous research. We found that the Enders-Siklos threshold co-integra-
tion relationships between the U.S. S&P 500 Index and most of the stock markets in
Asia, Europe, and north and south America increased significantly—except the mar-
kets in China market Brazil, and the logistic smooth transition co-integration rela-
tionships between the U.S. stock market and most of all the stock markets in our
study increased significantly—except the market in China—especially after Lehman
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Brothers (Dimitriou et al., 2013; Kenourgios and Dimitriou, 2015) filed for bank-
ruptcy. However, in both models, the co-integration relationship did not exist
between the U.S. market and Chinese market around the subprime crisis.
The information demonstrated that the subprime crisis in the U.S. had a contagion
effect on international stock markets. When the adjustments of asymmetric and logis-
tic smooth transition in stock markets were compared, the influence of good news
(positive information) and bad news (negative information) in the U.S. market was
significantly enhanced during the crisis (threshold co-integration and logistic smooth
transition co-integration). Furthermore, the smooth parameter also significantly
increased after the shock of the crisis, the results of which showed evidence that the
homogeneity or non-heteroscedasticity of information transmission in international
stock markets increased significantly during the period of the subprime crisis.10 It
was more likely that the transmission of massive negative information resulted in
higher risk aversion for international investors.
The second finding differed from previous literature. Previous works on financial
crises revealed that most crises originated from emerging markets. (Aggarwal et al.,
1999; Collins and Biekpe, 2003; Dungey et al., 2006). Neighbouring countries were
easily affected because of their close geographical locations to the origin of the finan-
cial crisis. However, the subprime crisis was not from an emerging market. In add-
ition, the contagion effect of the stock markets in Canada, western and northern
European countries and developed countries in Asia, i.e., the mature capital markets,
were more significant than that in developing countries in Asia, eastern European
and Latin America. It was contrary to our assumption that Asian, eastern European
and Latin American emerging markets would be affected more severely. The possible
explanation was that the degree of financial linkage with the U.S. market contributed
to the strength of the contagion effect. Since the relatively advanced stock markets in
western and northern European countries and in the developed countries in Asia
were globalised and deregulated markets, they were affected notably. Because the
stock markets in developing countries in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America
were less globalised and less deregulated, they were affected moderately. Unlike a
financial crisis of an emerging market, the subprime crisis caused quite different con-
tagion effects which were explored in this research.
Finally, the subprime crisis had weakened international portfolio diversification;
therefore, international investors could not diversify their risks by investing in the
Asian, European and American stock markets during the crisis. It is likely that if a
world financial centre is in trouble, global investors will be unavoidably influenced.
We would like to discuss the research limitations and further possible research in
this study, which were stated in the methodologies. Regarding the research limita-
tions, the Enders and Siklos (2001) asymmetric co-integration frameworks, including
M-TAR and LSTC models, were employed to conduct the empirical works. Although
the methodologies of this study could solve two problems—the 'symmetric adjust-
mentsʼ in the co-integration relationship in the traditional co-integration model and
secondly the smooth transition of the transitional variables between two regimes, or
heteroscedasticity in the information transmission in different markets—there still
existed limitations in the methods for the contagion effect test in this study compared
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to other approaches proposed in recent years. This includes the AG-DCC GARCH
models, the rolling window sub-sample Granger causality test and the dynamic copu-
las with and without regime-switching (Cappiello et al., 2006; Okimoto, 2008; Balcilar
et al., 2010; Kenourgios et al., 2011), the measurement of volatility, the better fitting
in an empirical model, the endogenous determination of a cutting point for crisis and
non-crisis periods, and the length of a crisis period. Many studies employed the
Markov regime switching model to endogenously identify the length of a crisis period
(Boyer et al., 2006).
For further research—since there are limitations in the methods of this study com-
pared to other advanced approaches—we look forward to conducting further empir-
ical investigations by using more advanced methods, and we also look forward to
providing substantial findings and contributions on economics and finances.
Notes
1. A large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) program in the U.S. government’s QE policies,
including the purchase of mortgage backed securities (MBS) and government sponsored
enterprise (GSE) debts, was expanded to the U.S. Treasury bond markets afterwards.
Moreover, the QE policy was divided into QE I (25 November 2008 to 31 March 2010),
QE II (3 November 2010 to 30 June 2011), QE III (13 September 2012 to 18 December
2013) and QE IV (23 December 2013 to 29 October 2014) from 2008 to 2014. Source:
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). For a detailed review of the main steps
of QE, please refer to Fawley and Neely (2013).
2. Forbes and Rigobon (2001) indicated that the loose financial regulatory systems, high
financial deficits and government debts, insufficient foreign exchange, and unstable
exchange rates in the emerging countries all contributed to the consequences of the
financial crises in those countries.
3. In this study, the entire sample period was from 1 September 2005 to 31 March 2010,
which included the period of QE I (2008/11/25–2010/3/31). The period of QE I was an
early period of the QE policy. In the period of QE I, there were no significant effects yet
from the QE policy to the U.S., Europe and global financial markets (Flavin and
Sheenan, 2015; Lien et al., 2018; Mamaysky, 2018). Therefore, we believe that there
existed very limited effects from the QE policy to the results in this study.
4. Enders and Granger (1998) indicated that the M-TAR model was especially valuable
when adjustment was asymmetric such that the series exhibited more 'momentumʼ in
one direction than the other.
5. The threshold value was endogenously determined by using Chan’s (1993) grid search
method to find the consistent estimate of the threshold. This method arranged the
values, {Det }, in an ascending order and excluded the smallest and largest 15 percent;
and the consistent estimate of the threshold was the parameter that yielded the smallest
residual of sum squares (RSS) over the remaining 70 percent.
6. The sample of the stock index in China was Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index
(SSE Composite Index). Furthermore, there were restricted fluctuation ranges in the
stock markets of Taiwan, Korea, China, Russia, and Hungary, which were 7% for Taiwan,
15% for Korea, 10% for China, 10%–20% for Russia, and 25% for Hungary, respectively.
However, there were no such restrictions in the U.S., the U.K., Germany, Hong Kong
and Singapore stock markets. In past literature, many scholars questioned whether the
restrictions would affect researchers’ evaluation results. In our study, there were 14 days
on which the TSEC Weighted Index exceeded the 7% limit, 16 days on which the KOSPI
Composite Index exceeded the 15% limit, 11 days on which the SSE Composite Index
exceeded the 10% limit, 13 days on which the MICEX Index exceeded the 20% limit, and
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17 days on which the BUX Index exceeded the 25% limit in our research period, all of
which accounted for less than 3% of the entire samples. Shen and Wang (1998) indicated
that when the samples with restricted ranges were less than 5% of the entire samples,
their impact on the evaluation results could be considered insignificant. Furthermore,
due to the fact that the restricted fluctuation ranges were aimed at individual stocks, the
probability of the stock prices of those individual stocks rose and fell at the same time
was very low on a trading day. Since the stock indices were adopted in this study, the
influence from the restricted fluctuation ranges to our empirical results would not be
significant. The EMU sovereign-debt crisis event first occurred in Greece in December,
2009, and it gradually spread to Ireland and some southern European countries, e.g.,
Portugal, Spain and Italy. In order to fully avoid the influence of the interference from
the EMU sovereign-debt crisis to the empirical results in this study, we did not include
the southern European equity markets in the discussions of the empirical works in
our study.
7. NYSE and AMEX are the abbreviations of the New York Stock Exchange and the
American Stock Exchange, respectively.
8. In order to avoid bias and non-consistency in the empirical results due to the sample
numbers with huge differences around the subprime crisis and the influence of the
interference from the EMU sovereign-debt crisis, the entire sample period was set from 1
September 2005 to 31 March 2010 in our study.
9. In both Tables 5 and 6 in our study, the t statistics of correlation coefficients of returns
and the volatility of returns between various periods were calculated by Fisher’s Z
transformation
10. The statement that 'The homogeneity of information transmission in international stock
markets increasedʼ implies that when the speed of information transmission increases
among stock markets, the points of time that the investors receive the information will
tend to be parallel.
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